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RECENT DECISIONS

BANKRUPTcY-TENANCY BY THE ENT1.ETIES--CREDITOR'S

RIGHT AGAINST

ENTIry PRoPERTY AFTER DISCHARGE OF HUSBAND iN BANKRupTCY-The
United States as assignee sought a joint judgment on four unsecured promis-

sory notes signed by the defendants, who are husband and wife. The husband had filed in bankruptcy before the assignment of the notes to plaintiff and was discharged from all debts filed in the bankruptcy proceeding
schedules (including the instant debt) prior to any action on these notes.
His estate by the entireties, however, was not used to satisfy any listed
debts. Held, plaintiff is entitled to proceed to judgment. A discharge in
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bankruptcy limits only the sources available for satisfaction. United States
v. Fetter and Fetter, (D.C. Mich. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 10.
., Although an estate by the entireties at common law was subject to the
husband's control' and to the claims of his creditors,2 the wife could not be
deprived of her right of survivorship in the estate. 3 Her indefeasible right
rendered the estate valueless as a means of obtaining credit.4 One result of
the enactment of married women's property acts5 was that the entirety estate became available to, joint creditors6 and accordingly became a valuable source of obtaining credit for a husband and wife7 Generally under
these acts neither party alone has an alienable interest in the estates or
any interest available to his individual creditors. 9 This immunity from
individual creditors results in the exclusion of the entirety estate from the
property used to satisfy creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding against either
spouse, since the Bankruptcy Act does not provide for joint discharges10
And the result of an individual discharge is to release a person from all
debts,' individual and joint."' Consequently, the creditor, who must get a
joint.judgment in order to perfect a lien on the entirety property,= may be

12 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3.d ed., .455 (1959).

2 Id., §434.

S MADDEN, PERSONS AND DosEsTTc RY.ELATIONS 125 (1951). See Edwards & Chamberlin
Hardware Co. v. Pethick, 250 Mich. 315 at 319, 250 N.W. 186 (1950). See also 82 A.LR.
1285 (195).
4 At common law a married woman could not affect her interest in property by a
-conveyance. See Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N.Y. 9 at 12 (1850).
5 Mich. Comp. Laws. (1948) §557.51, Sec. 1. This act is illustrative of the usual purpose of married women's property acts; that is, to abrogate the common law disability
of the wife to contract and become liable jointly with her husband.
6 Mich. Comp. Laws. (1948) §557.53, Sec. 3. "Hereafter the real estate of the husband
and wife owned by them as tenants by entirety . .. shall be liable to seizure and sale
on execution ... in satisfaction of any judgment which has been recovered against the
persons -who were at the time of the execution of such written instrument husband and
wife jointy or the survivor upon .any instrument signed by both."
r The court in Edwards &cChamberlin Hardware Co. v. Pethick, note 3 supra, points
ott 'at 319 thaf one purpose of the statute was to alleviate the difficulty of obtaining
credit by a husband and wife whose only property interests were held by the entireties.
: . 8 By.the. nature of the estate by the entireties it cannot 'be disposed of without the
assent of both 'hfisband and wife. Schram v. Burt, (6th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 557 at 561.
But see 141 A.L.R. 179 (1942), for discussion of the abolishment of estates by the entireties
by.some married women's acts.
*
,9 For an extensive discussion of the interest of either
spouse in entirety property
being subject to individual creditors, see 166 A.L.R. 969 (1947).
10The Bankruptcy Act provides-that the discharge of one debtor will not affect the
10.
liabilities of his co-debtors, 50 Stat. 550, §16 (1898), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §54, and nowhere
does it provide for a joint discharge of co-debtors. But see A3 CORP. RloRG. 259 at 262
(1940) for cases where some bankruptcy courts 'have consolidated proceedings against a
husband and wife to allow the tenancy by the entireties to be used for the satisfaction
9f their joint creditors.
S11. All provable claims are released by -the discharge except those exempted by 30
Stat. 550, §17 (1898), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §35. See 1 COLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Moore ed., §17.27
(1956).
12 Dioguardi v. Curran, (4th Cir. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 431 at 432.
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prevented from doing so by the discharge of one spouse in bankruptcy. Yet
it would seem that the debtor ought not to be allowed to keep the property
used to obtain credit and at the same time escape liability on his debt. Thus

courts face the dilemma of determining how to protect the joint creditor's
right against the entirety estate without being in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. It seems settled that the joint creditor may apply to the bankruptcy court for a stay of proceedings until he obtains in the state court a
judgment and lien against the entirety property. 13 A difficult problem arises,
however, in finding a suitable theory for allowing the creditor to obtain a
judgment and lien subsequent to the husband's discharge in bankruptcy.
One line of cases has held that once the debtor is discharged, the creditor
has lost all right to proceed against him. 14 This seems unduly harsh in
view of authority recognizing the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to be to
discharge a debtor from his personal debts in consideration for his giving
up his property for liquidation among his creditors, and not to operate on
property unavailable to the bankruptcy court. 15 Other courts have used a
variety of theories to allow the creditor to proceed against the estate after
the husband's discharge. One theory used is that the creditor's action is
quasi-in-rem, thereby circumventing the defense of a discharge from personal liability. 18 While there may be some basis for this approach, as the
creditor is seeking to establish his interest in particular property, still the
creditor in such an action must be given the right to proceed against the
debtor on the personal obligation. Another approach taken has been to
regard the common law unity of the tenants by the entireties17 as a distinct
entity which is subject to suit even though one or both of its members has
been discharged from personal liability.'3 This, however, appears to be
creating a fiction to reach a desired result.19 The holding in the instant

13 Echelbarger v. First Nat. Bank of Swayzee, 211 Ind. 199 at 202-203, 5 N.E. (2d)
966 (1987). See Wharton v. Citizen's Bank of Bosworth, 223 Mo. App. 236, 15 S.W. (2d)
860 (1929); 82 A.L.R. 1235 (1933); Phillips v. Krakower, (4th Cir. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 764;
8 REMINaTON, BANxRuuircy, Henderson ed., §3238 (1955).
14 Wharton v. Citizen's Bank of Bosworth, note 13 supra; Dickey v. Thompson, 323
Mo. 107, 18 S.W. (2d) 388 (1929). See also Phillips v. Krakower, 'note 13 supra.
15 First Nat. Bank of Goodland v. Pothuisje, 217 Ind. 1 at 12, 25 N.E. (2d) 436 (1940);
Echelbarger v. First Nat. Bank of Swayzee, note 13 supra; Phillips v. Krakower, note
13 supra. "The rule is now well settled that the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction
to enforce a lien or claim on exempt property and that such matters must be litigated,
usually in the state courts." 1 Coimua, BANrUPrcY, Moore ed., §6.05 (1956); 8 REMiNarON,
BANKRUPTCY, Henderson ed., §3229 (1955).
16 Edwards & Chamberlin Hardware Co. v. Pethick, note 3 supra; Kolakowski v.
Cyman, 285 Mich. 585, 281 N.W. 332 (1938); 8 REMINGTON, BANKRuPTcY, Henderson ed.,
§3229 (1955).
17 MADDEN, PERSONS AND Dom-sc RELATIONS 123 (1931).
18First Nat. Bank of Goodland v. Pothuisje, note 15 supra; 130 A.L.R. 1244 (1941).
See notes, 89 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1073 at 1080-1081 (1941); 53 HAiv. L. REv. 1389 at 1390
(1940).
19 See note, 55 H .v. L. REv. 1389 at 1390 (1940).
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case suggests a more suitable rationale. A discharge in bankruptcy is
treated only as limiting the sources of property available for satisfaction.
Thus since the estate by the entireties is unavailable to general creditors of
the individual bankrupt, the bankruptcy proceeding has no effect on such
property. This property is still available to those who have the right to proceed against it. Taken together with the view that a discharge in bankruptcy does not destroy the debtor's liabilities but rather provides him with
an affirmative defense,20 a sound basis has been supplied for allowing the
joint creditor to proceed against the entirety property even after discharge
of the individual debtor in bankruptcy.
E. Roger Frisch

20 "Discharge in bankruptcy is an affirmative defense and it cannot be presumed that
the discharged debtor will plead it" (as a bar to the enforcement of the creditor's judgment). 1 CoLmn, BANKEuprOY, Moore ed., §16.06 (1956); First Nat. Bank of Goodland v.
Pothuisje, note 15 supra, at 7 and 8.

